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The law governing assisted conception in the United Kingdom (UK) (the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990) mandates through section 13(5) that clinicians make ‘child welfare’ 
assessments before proceeding with treatment. In the 1990 Act, section 13(5) stated that 
assessment should take into account ‘the need … for a father’, but in section 13(5) of a revised 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 2008 the words ‘a father’ were replaced with ‘supportive 
parenting’ in order to signal official recognition of same-sex parents. This article challenges the 
idea that this might be seen as an unequivocally progressive development through reference to a 
growing body of scholarship that critically evaluates the attention that policy makers have come 
to pay to ‘parenting’. It discusses the sociopolitical context that gave rise to section 13(5) and 
the pressures that led to its reform. Findings from an interview study with members of staff who 
work in assisted conception clinics in the UK are then discussed, focusing on staff’s perceptions of 
the new policy, the meanings they ascribe to the term ‘supportive parenting’ and their opinions 
about the responsibility they are given under law for child welfare. The article concludes that 
professionals’ understandings of their role resonate strongly with the wider realities of the oversight 
of parent–child relations considered characteristic of policies on parenting.
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Introduction
The emergence of ‘explicit’ family policy over the past two decades, focused on 
inluencing the ways that parents ‘parent’, has been noted and explored (Clarke, 
2007; Furedi, 2008; Gillies, 2011; Rudoe, 2014). Critical engagement with this rise of 
‘parenting’ has highlighted that policy has become more ‘child centred’ with children’s 
‘needs’, ‘welfare’ and ‘rights’ emphasised as requiring greater attention from policy 
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changed as a result, as the individual parent has become the target of intervention 
to address perceived deicits or risks to the welfare of children, presented by what is 
termed ‘poor parenting’. Gillies (2011) has concluded, of the re-shaping of family 
policy as a result, that ‘governments have come to see families more in terms of 
their practices than structures, with “what families do” readily translating into a new 
ideology of family competence’. Family policy has moved away from a focus on 
‘structure’ to instead lay claim to an interest in the everyday conduct of family life, in 
particular what parents do with their children and how they interact with them. Some 
emphasise the expansion and changing forms of policy-driven professional oversight 
over (particularly working-class) parents as they go about ‘parenting’ their children 
associated with this emphasis on ‘practices’ (Jensen, 2010; Wastell and White, 2012).
Hennum (2014: 441) has argued that while ‘child-centred’ policy of this kind can 
appear benign and progressive, the efect of the focus on ‘competence’ in relation 
to ‘the child’s needs’ is to position both children and their parents as ‘objects rather 
than subjects in their own lives’, requiring that they ‘live up to the standards of life 
deined for them by experts’. ‘The child’ is seen as less as a unique individual, than 
as a general child, with expert-identiied, generically deined ‘needs’. In turn, ‘the 
parent’ is deined as a person who needs to gain ‘parenting skills’ or ‘competencies’, 
or risks failing to meet these ‘needs’. One outcome of this sort of policy, it is argued, 
is the opening up of the parent–child relationship in a way that reconigures privacy 
(Lee, 2014). Gillies (2011) summarises the situation the following way:
Since the advent of the New Labour government in 1997 there has been 
a remarkably aggressive attempt to re-position a family life as a public 
rather than a private concern. Previous legislation and sensibilities which 
placed everyday personal and family life as largely outside the remit of state 
intervention have been explicitly challenged through a moral focus on 
children as the most important constituents of family life.
Many thousands of people become parents through assisted conception, and here 
too the term ‘parenting’ features in policy concerned with child welfare. Assisted 
conception services are regulated by law through the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 (which came into force in August 1991). In 2008, the 
HFE Act was reformed, and the term ‘parenting’ came to feature in it. Section 13(5) 
of the Act now reads:
A woman shall not be provided with [infertility] treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a 
result of the treatment (including the need of that child for supportive parenting), 
and of any other child who may be afected by the birth. (Emphasis added) 
The inclusion of the words ‘supportive parenting’, and the efects of this reform, 
are interesting matters to consider in the light of the wider assessment of policies 
on ‘parenting’ noted above. In the context of assisted conception, use of the term 
‘supportive parenting’ may appear as a more ambiguous development than oppressive 
expansion of professional oversight of ‘parenting’ suggested by Gillies (2011). The 
version of the ‘child welfare’ clause that pertained up to 2008, as we discuss further 
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parenting’), signalling that clinics must consider very carefully the merits of treating 
single women or lesbian couples. Reform of section 13(5) resulted in part from 
arguments that the law should no longer encourage discrimination against these groups 
of (prospective) parents (or indeed any other would-be parents). As the Department 
of Health put it, the 1990 Act had been ‘framed in terms of heterosexual couples’ 
and should be changed better to ‘recognise the wider range of people who seek and 
receive assisted reproduction services in the 21st century’ (Hinslif, 2004). The term 
‘supportive parenting’ is in this way presented as a progressive measure to increase 
social equality, not as an efort to encourage scrutiny of ‘parenting’ competence. 
Further, the guidance on interpreting the law given by the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority’s (HFEA) Code of Practice (CoP)1 suggests a deinition 
of ‘parenting’ dissimilar to that characteristic of family policy more generally. The 
eighth edition of the CoP (published in 2009) emphasises the importance of clinics 
not discriminating against those seeking treatment because of their sexuality (and 
also on any other ground, for example disability). The CoP details what ‘taking 
account’ of ‘child welfare’ might mean in practice, and recommends that clinics should 
henceforth take a ‘lighter touch’ approach (Cranshaw, 2009; Lee et al, 2012). It states 
that prospective patients should be ‘presumed’ to be future ‘supportive parents’ and 
that clinics need only carry out further investigations where there is an indication of 
a need to follow up about a possible problem with providing treatment because of 
information provided by a prospective patient on the preliminary assessment form 
that they complete. (The CoP lists factors that may suggest that follow-up is needed 
as including: past or current circumstances that may lead to any child experiencing 
serious physical or psychological harm or neglect; past or current circumstances that 
are likely to lead to an inability to care throughout childhood for any child who may 
be born; mental or physical conditions; and drug or alcohol abuse; HFEA, 2009.)
This new regulatory framework thus appears to be more permissive than the 
previous one, and apparently utilises the term ‘parenting’ in a diferent way from 
other areas of family policy. Yet it is nevertheless still the case that section 13(5) in 
its present, as well as its past, form makes it illegal for anyone to be provided with 
treatment unless the clinic irst carries out a ‘welfare of the child’ assessment. One 
study into the workings of the old section 13(5) argued that this approach has an 
inescapable consequence: ‘This process forces providers of fertility services into 
making decisions as to who will make the ‘better’ parents by implication’ (Savas and 
Treece, 1998: 246). Some who have written about the new section 13(5) contend 
that regardless of the ‘lighter’ touch of the assessment process and the wording of the 
latest CoP, this underlying presumption remains. Fenton et al (2010: 278) conclude, 
for example, that ‘the retention of the welfare principle in its new form still means 
that clinicians are the gatekeepers: they, rather than women, still have the inal say as 
to who has access to treatment’. 
The study reported here is grounded in these apparent ambiguities in the use of 
the term ‘parenting’ as part of the regulation of assisted conception. It goes beyond 
the existing literature in providing the irst, detailed empirical study of how the new 
section 13(5) is being interpreted and applied in practice. Here, we report indings 
from an interview study with members of staf (nurses, counsellors and embryologists 
as well as doctors) who work in 20 of the around 80 registered assisted conception 
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section 13(5) and its context. We then move on to briely outline the methodology 
we used for the study before discussing indings.
 ‘Family values’ and section 13(5) of the HFE Act 
In vitro fertilisation (IVF) was developed in the 1970s, and 1978 saw the birth of the 
irst baby whose conception was assisted using IVF. However, these developments 
in medicine occurred at a time when public debate in Britain included a powerful 
discourse highlighting the perceived moral decay of society and the loss of ‘family 
values’. The 1980s has been considered a decade of ‘moral panic’ (Furedi, 1992); as 
political scientist Martin Durham (1991: 5) described it, ‘in article after article’ at this 
time, ‘rising divorce rates, one-parent families, abortion, homosexuality, pornography 
– all have been cited as indices of a nation facing moral collapse’ (1991: 5). The furious 
debates that took place through the 1980s about assisted conception and embryo 
research can be usefully understood within this context, with three points worthy 
of emphasis. 
First, opposition to assisted conception became a clear focus for ‘family values’ 
campaigners. Indeed, moral panics about what had become possible because of new 
medical techniques continued after the passing of the 1990 HFE Act, for example 
in the ‘virgin birth’ frenzy of 1991 (Barney, 2005). Second, these concerns about 
‘moral collapse’ came to be expressed in law, through section 13(5) of the HFE Act. 
The committee charged with developing the basis for the HFE Act found in its inal, 
highly inluential report that it was morally wrong to create a child to be born into 
a non-traditional family:
[T]he interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where 
there is a loving, stable, heterosexual relationship and that, therefore, the 
deliberate creation of a child for a woman who is not a partner in such a 
relationship is morally wrong. (Warnock, 1984, para 2.11)
Third, this outcome was atypical. Durham’s (1991) study of a range of ‘moral’ issues 
makes it clear that there was a general reluctance on the part of the government to 
commit to policies and laws about the family that would ‘remoralise’ society. Gillies 
(2014) suggests that this gap between the oftentimes fervent rhetorical moralism of 
the 1980s, set against actual policy change, can be explained by the Conservative Party 
government at this time viewing the family as ‘of limits’ for overt state intervention; 
while moralism may have appeared attractive to some politicians rhetorically, the 
propensity for this to translate generally into the government enacting a political 
programme based on moralised precepts was for this reason limited. In this respect, 
section 13(5) stands out as anomalous compared with the general trend in law 
and policy at the time (the other obvious exception being section 28 of the Local 
Government Act 1988; Durham 1991). It is arguable that the novelty of the medical 
technology, the fact that this technology was about the manipulation of the embryo, 
bringing with it the spectre of scientists ‘playing God’, combined with the wider 
sensibility of moral decline, meant that IVF became a lightning rod for moralistic 
concerns that could ind actual expression in law. 
Parliament came close to deciding that Warnock’s (1984) moral imperative should 
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However, this ban was rejected in favour of the legal demand that those who provide 
treatment ‘take account’ of the ‘welfare of the child’ not yet born, as well as that of 
any child already born ‘who may be afected by the treatment’, and that this must 
include ‘the need … for a father’. The understanding on the part of some at least in 
1990 was that in practice this would mean that clinicians would understand that they 
should exclude certain women from treatment, and that in particular the candidates 
for exclusion would be single women and lesbians. ‘It would appear’, explain Gurnham 
and Miola (2012: 30), ‘that it [section 13(5)] not only implied but actually envisioned 
that treatment should in most (if not all) cases be provided to heterosexual couples, 
with all the consequences that low for those outside this group’. However, even if it 
was believed by some in Parliament that section 13(5) would constitute a long-term 
bulwark against the treatment of single women and lesbians, this was not the eventual 
outcome. Rather, section 13(5) became the subject of continual debate through the 
1990s (and led to eventual reform). 
In 2008, furious debate accompanied the reform process and the removal of the 
words ‘a father’ from section 13(5) proved extremely contentious (McCandless and 
Sheldon, 2010). It is arguable, however, that section 13(5) was destined for reform, 
because of its atypical upholding of a particular form of family. In part, the demise of ‘a 
father’ was because of the level of tension that had come to exist, and was recognised 
to exist, between the law, on the one hand, and practice in assisted conception clinics, 
on the other. While studies indicated that section 13(5) was being used by some 
clinics to discriminate in the way some in Parliament had intended, others found to 
the contrary (Blyth et al, 2008). Changes outside the clinic also forced legal reform. 
The inconsistency between a law on assisted conception that upheld ‘the father’, 
on the one hand, and sex equality legislation and developments permitting same-
sex couples to adopt, on the other, led policy makers to perceive a need to change 
the terms of the welfare clause (McCandless and Sheldon, 2010). Further, from the 
New Labour government onwards, the oicial position regarding family policy more 
generally came to be that there are ‘families’ that take a variety of forms, rather than 
one unitary ‘family’ (Macvarish, 2014). 
Yet although ‘the need for … a father’ came to be seen as problematic, section 13(5) 
in toto did not. Arguments were made during the reform process for the deletion of 
section 13(5) altogether. Echoing the arguments made by the legal scholar Jackson 
(2002), the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee advocated 
‘a radical position’ that would ‘remove the clinic’s responsibility to take into account 
any child welfare considerations before ofering a service, but would merely require 
them to alert social services if they became concerned for the welfare of any child 
born as a result of treatment they were providing’ (Blyth et al, 2008: 33). However, 
this approach to section 13(5) gained little traction; the debate ‘proceeded on very 
constricted terms’ (McCandless, 2013: 136), an outcome suggesting that, for policy 
makers in Parliament at least, two aspects of section 13(5) are non-negotiable. 
The irst is continuing to have the ‘welfare principle’ as part of the regulation of 
fertility treatment; as Fenton et al (2010: 277) note, during the passage of the Act ‘there 
was little discussion about the welfare principle as a whole’. In this sense, the Warnock 
Committee’s precept that the ‘deliberate creation’ of a child is a moral question requiring 
special regulatory attention continues to resonate, even where helping lesbians or single 
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assessments, Parliament took the view that clinicians must continue to take responsibility 
for decision making, under the guidance of the HFEA. According to Jackson (2001), 
the decision in 1990 to make clinicians responsible in law for ‘child welfare’ was 
signiicant because Parliament medicalised this responsibility: ‘moral’ decisions on 
access to treatment were made contingent on the exercise of medical discretion. The 
retention of section 13(5) suggests that politicians continue to consider this delegation 
of responsibility to doctors to be the best approach. 
In the remainder of this article we consider how those who remain responsible for 
assessing child welfare pre-conception view the regulations as they now stand, and 
their work in implementing them. How do staf think about what it means to ‘take 
into account’ the ‘welfare of a child’ pre-conception? What do they take ‘supportive 
parenting’ to mean and how do they take the potential for it ‘into account’? What 
do they think of the responsibility they are given in law, as assessors of the future 
welfare of children who may be born to those looking to them to help them to 
become parents?
Researching ‘welfare of the child’ assessments in the clinic 
Studies into ‘welfare of the child’ assessments carried out from 1990 to 2008 inluenced 
the approach we took in our research (see Lee et al, 2012, for a review of this work). 
One option was to use a postal questionnaire. However, a set of issues meant that we 
decided to carry out an interview study at a sample of clinics instead. The demands 
of ethics approval were one consideration. Previous studies were carried out when 
the National Health Service (NHS) requirements for ethical and Research and 
Development (R&D) approval were less extensive than was the case in 2011/12, when 
the data collection for our study took place. It was judged that gaining approval for all 
UK licensed clinics and attaining a good-enough response rate using questionnaires 
could prove very di cult given time and inancial constraints. Additionally, we wanted 
to ind out about staf perceptions about a process of change, not simply ascertain 
facts about clinic practice, so an interview study seemed more appropriate. 
The HFE Act mandates that any clinic must have a named person, called the Person 
Responsible (PR), to whom the license to provide treatment is issued and who is 
then responsible for ensuring that the clinic acts legally (HFE Act 1990, section 17; 
HFEA, no date). We were clear that at each clinic we wanted to interview the PR, 
and if this was not possible an alternative person recommended by the clinic. We were 
encouraged early in the research process by members of the advisory group3 for the 
study to also try to ind out about the views of a variety of professionals working 
in clinics. Their point was that, in practice, although the PR is legally responsible, a 
variety of members of staf may have an input into discussions and decision making, 
including, for example, counsellors and embryologists. 
We aimed to interview staf at 20 clinics, representing approximately one quarter 
of the 77 clinics licensed to carry out IVF treatment at the time. Through desk 
research and discussion with advisory group members, we considered which clinics 
to approach on the basis of:
• the size of the clinic; 
• the range of services ofered; 
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• the clinic’s reputation regarding a liberal or a more restrictive approach to 
accepting patients for treatment; 
• the location of the clinic. 
We approached 44 clinics as a result, with an ‘in principle’ request that they consider 
participating in the study and 20 clinics were selected from those that agreed. Clinics 
were chosen in all regions of the UK, ranging in size from the smallest to the largest 
type of centre (determined by number of cycles of treatment carried out per year 
according to HFEA 2009 igures). Ethics approval was granted in May 2011 by the 
Oxfordshire Research Ethics Committee B and we also obtained consent from the 
R&D oice of each NHS research site. We interviewed staf with diferent professional 
backgrounds at all clinics in the sample. Sixty-six interviews were conducted in total, 
including 18 nurses, 13 embryologists and 12 counsellors as well as doctors. 
The interview schedule sought to take into account issues raised by previous studies. 
Our literature review indicated that prior to 2008 it had already become much less 
likely that clinics would refuse in advance to treat on child welfare grounds because 
of the sexuality or relationship status of prospective patients. Our irst set of questions 
thus addressed ‘the route to treatment’, and we included questions that asked about 
which patients might be denied treatment by clinics as a result of their approach to 
the ‘welfare of the child’ assessment, and asked if this ever occurred in advance or if 
it happened as a result of the welfare assessment in the clinic. Our second group of 
questions then sought to ind out about the ‘welfare of the child’ assessment in the 
clinic, and stafs’ perceptions of the procedures involved. Our inal set of questions 
asked about opinions on the old and new versions of section 13(5). 
Qualitative data analysis software NVivo (version 9) was used to support the 
analysis of transcribed interview data. Data analysis was conducted in two stages. Stage 
one was an analysis of the responses to questions to give us factual and numerical 
information as far as was possible. For example, we wanted to generate a picture of 
how many patients were refused treatment on child welfare grounds. To generate this 
sort of information we restricted the analysis to the transcripts with the PR. Stage 
two of the analysis was a qualitative, thematic reading of responses in the whole set 
of interviews. Accounts of the indings overall have been published elsewhere (Lee 
et al, 2014; Sheldon et al, 2015).  Here we focus on discussing what respondents had 
to say in response to the following questions:
• What have been the efects of removing the requirement to consider the ‘need 
for … a father’? (Coded as positive, negative, marginal/no efect)
• What does ‘supportive parenting’ (as used in the 2008 law) mean? (Coded as yes 
meaningful, not meaningful, ambivalent)
• Does the legal requirement to take into account the welfare of the child serve 
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The ‘welfare of the child’ and ‘supportive parenting’ in the clinic 
Non-discrimination and the end of ‘the need for … a father’
Among PRs, only one out of 20 respondents indicated that they perceived the efects 
of the removal of the words ‘a father’ from the law to be ‘negative’. However, as the 
following extract indicates, this respondent was aware that their view was now unusual:
‘When I came there [to work in an IVF clinic] irst of all, I was not in the 
minority … and then as time goes on … younger people come in with 
diferent views and we began to be aware that there was a shift in the mentality 
of people … many more people would be quite happy to treat same-sex 
couples and once you go beyond 50 per cent then it becomes quite di cult 
to say: “No. We won’t do it”.’ 
Seven PRs were ‘positive’ about the legal change and for 12 PRs, legal reform was 
‘marginal’ or had ‘no efect’. Across the interviews as a whole, the pattern was similar; 
very few were negative about the change to the law and staf overall were mostly 
keen to stress that they had no di culties with the new legal requirements: 
‘Two lesbians, single women, I think we’ve moved away from that being a 
“welfare of the child” issue.’ (Counsellor)
‘Same-sex couples are very much just the norm nowadays. We also changed 
the paperwork so most of it says patient and partner or female and partner 
rather than saying female and male because it’s quite embarrassing when 
you’re trying to do the paperwork when you’ve got two ladies and, you 
know, you’re sort of saying: “Could you ... could you sign for the male?” 
No!’ (Nurse)
In so far as there was evidence of disquiet, respondents generally tended to make a 
distinction between their own sensibilities and how procedures operate. The following 
counsellor explained how they had come to self-police their language and modify 
their approach: 
‘I think for me personally it’s made a big diference because I am quite 
cautious how I talk about that now. I think that I used to have … law on 
my side that I could say: … “What are your feelings about the role of men 
in your life? What do you think of male role models?” ... I personally feel I 
have to be much more cautious about that because I don’t want to be seen 
as … I have some agenda, some judgement, some personal feelings about 
that, so I have changed the way I work with them.’ (Counsellor)
The general impression given, then, was of a strongly perceived need to ‘not 
discriminate’ and a sense that the provision of assisted conception has, over time, 
come to be characterised by this imperative. Indeed, many respondents were keen 
to emphasise that they worked in a way that was ahead of the law; that they had 





















































After the ‘need for … a father’
79
had contributed to change. As we now discuss, however, this does not mean that ‘the 
welfare of the child’ ceases to function as a major inluence over service provision. 
‘Supportive parenting’ 
At face value, there seemed to be diversity of opinion among the 20 PRs about 
whether ‘supportive parenting’ was ‘meaningful’: four answered ‘no’, 10 ‘yes’ and six 
indicated ambivalence in their irst response to this question. However, a closer look at 
their comments indicates an important similarity in the way most discussed ‘supportive 
parenting’. The majority attempted to ind a way to give the term meaning (rather 
than, for example, reject it and argue that it could have no possible meaning when 
there is not even a biological pregnancy, still less a baby). Comments thus projected 
forward, away from the reality of the present (infertile patients seeking medical help 
to conceive) into possible future parenthood. Respondents often used tentative and 
unsure language to sketch the meaning of ‘supportive parenting’, relying on phrases 
such as ‘I suppose’, ‘probably’ and ‘I guess it would….’. However, there was no evidence 
of a rejection of the idea that it was possible or right to assess future ‘parenting’. 
This attention to the future pertained even where there were diferences in emphasis. 
First, we found that this was the case where ‘supportive parenting’ was interpreted 
as legitimating ‘non-conventional’ families. One PR told us: “I think the need for a 
father is old-fashioned ... I don’t think it its with society anymore.” However, this 
rejection meant that the focus now became, directly, ‘the child’ and how it would 
be ‘looked after’: “[I]t basically means: is that child going to be brought up in a way 
that is for the large part normal? You know, is the child going to be happy? Are they 
going to be well looked after? Are they going to be well cared for?” 
Second, and in contrast, others placed more emphasis on ‘supportive parenting’ 
meaning that there was a continued need for discussion about ‘male igures’ and 
‘male role models’. While there was no suggestion that treatment would be denied, 
the following respondent emphasised that discussion should, for ‘single women’ and 
‘a same-sex couple’, cover them being ‘aware’ about the role of men:
‘Maybe [supportive parenting] is the right word because I don’t know what 
other term there would be but it’s the upbringing of the child, isn’t it. And 
recognising that if ... if it’s a single woman or a same-sex couple that ... that 
to give a child an all-round life experience and whatever else that they need 
to be aware of the role of men in society and relationships.’ 
However, although the emphasis is diferent here, similar attention is focused on ‘the 
child’ in the future and what ‘experience’ of ‘relationships’ might be like if treatment 
is successful and a baby is born.
Third, some PRs (for example, two who each initially indicated that they did not 
consider ‘supportive parenting’ meaningful) suggested more directly that ‘supportive 
parenting’ meant having a discussion with prospective parents about what being 
a parent will entail. One told us that the term ‘supportive parenting’ “would be 
considered like management speak” and that it is not a term staf would use. This 
respondent then went on to explain, however, that “this is all about making sure that 
the parents can do the job and look after the child properly”. Another PR put it in 
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‘I don’t think it’s a term that’s used commonly ... I talk more probably about 
family support … what level of input are you going to have from parents, 
siblings, rather than put it as supportive parenting. I will always say, you 
know: “Are you planning this? Is there anybody else going to be involved 
in their lives?”’
While discussion about ‘support networks’ or relationships that a child may form in 
the future with others may appear relatively benign, discussing this goes well beyond 
what the regulations require as part of a ‘welfare of the child’ assessment. As we noted 
previously, the CoP states that ‘supportive parenting’ (deined as a ‘commitment to the 
health, well-being and development of the child’) can be ‘presumed’, but that where 
‘centres have concern as to whether this commitment exists, they may wish to take 
account of wider family and social networks within which the child will be raised’ 
(HFEA, 2009, para 8.11). In the accounts above, the approach described involves 
considerably more scrutiny than this ‘light-touch’ one. Taking comments from the set 
of interviews as a whole, it appeared as though conversations about ‘support networks’ 
were at many clinics routine, and that ‘supportive parenting’ was about making sure 
that prospective parents had thought ahead and planned, and could articulate how 
future ‘parenting’ arrangements would emerge. 
While in much of the previous literature, single women and lesbians are discussed 
together as similarly subject to discrimination, our study consistently found diferences 
in accounts given by diferent sorts of professionals of these groups’ treatment. This 
diferentiation seemed to turn on how more or less ‘thought through’ or ‘aware’ women 
were. For single women, the assumption sometimes seemed to be that because these 
women came to clinic alone, certain questions must be asked during counselling 
sessions focused on the ‘implications’ of treatment. For example:
Interviewer:  ‘Single women, are they still routinely brought forward for 
discussion from a “welfare of the child” point of view?’
Respondent:  ‘Yes ... well, they have to see the counsellor…. Because she 
has to look at whether they’ve got their coping mechanisms. I 
don’t think they any more say that they have to have a male role 
model … [it is] to make sure they’ve got support mechanisms 
and things like that.’ (Nurse)
A range of issues regarding the sorts of discussions it was necessary to have with 
single women were raised, including addressing with them the serious implications 
of having a child – for example the costs of childcare, or the demands a child might 
place on the mother – or more vague worries that a particular single woman was 
‘rather odd’ or that her personal circumstances were not conducive to raising a child. 
In these examples, it was the women’s motivations for having children that coloured 
perceptions of what needed to be discussed with them:
‘If they haven’t had a serious relationship for a number of years, I will sort 
of … wonder why … is there a commitment issue? You know, a baby is for 
life, like the dog is for life, not just for Christmas … and what does a child 
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‘You have to look at motivation for having children. We have had cases where 
a single woman has been motivated to come to us to have a child because, 
not for the sake of having a child, but really it’s transpired that they would 
move into better social housing if they had a child and things like that.’ (PR) 
These kinds of concerns about single women – focusing on checking for evidence 
of ‘commitment’ to a baby, or whether the motivation for treatment is ‘for the sake 
of the child’ – were sometimes framed through comparisons with lesbian patients:
‘We’re looking at why? Why do it on your own. If you look at Susan 
Golombok’s work … lesbian women couples do the best parenting. 
Heterosexual couples do the next best but single women struggle…. There’s 
one girl, it’s not that I knocked them back, but I really wanted them to ind 
out the actual practical realities of childcare costs and after two sessions with 
me this girl who was adamant she had to be treated next month, sort of 
dropped out because she said she just can’t aford to do it. It’s the practical 
realities of parenting.’ (Counsellor)
Indeed, in general, respondents were keen to point out how ‘good’ lesbian patients 
could be as future parents, with the counsellor quoted above making reference to ‘the 
evidence’ that lesbian parenting is superior. What was notable about this reasoning 
was its emphasis on being ‘thought through’ in relation to the details of future family 
ife and ‘parenting’. This was the measure of their competence, a demonstration that 
they were already putting the welfare of the child irst, in contrast to single women 
who were discussed as being ill-prepared and insuiciently focused on ‘the child’. 
For example:
‘In reality, actually lesbian couples are very well thought out often before 
they come. There still is an awful lot they have to think about, but … they’re 
often a joy to work with because they really do think about the child and 
managing diference because they’re already managing diference in the fact 
that their sexuality is diferent so they’re often very, very well thought out 
but there’s still a lot of stuf we need to discuss.’ (Counsellor)
Although pre-conception discussion of ‘supportive parenting’ is inevitably nebulous, 
it is thus given meaning by clinic staf as they assume the need to discuss the future 
with those they treat. Further, ‘supportive parenting’ is interpreted in ways that go 
beyond the deinitions provided in the regulations. Notably, the following were all 
considered by some to constitute legitimate terrain of discussion: plans for childcare, 
reasons for wanting to be a mother and perceptions of what parenthood entails. 
Who needs ‘welfare of the child’ laws in assisted conception?
In answer to the question, ‘Does the legal requirement to take into account the 
welfare of the child serve any ongoing useful purpose?’, only two PRs replied ‘no’. 
Nine answered ‘yes’ and the same number were ambivalent. The two respondents 
who answered ‘no’ and some of those indicating ambivalence emphasised that their 
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trustworthy to do what is needed by merit of being professionals. As one PR who 
replied ‘no’ to this question told us: “They should just trust the doctors and nurses.” 
A PR who was ambivalent about whether section 13(5) is useful, told us that “it is a 
serious issue … it’s absolutely right for it to igure into your decision making”, but 
also said, of the law: “Does it really change clinical practice? It doesn’t really.” 
At the start of this article we noted how the case has been made (but never seriously 
considered in Parliament) that section 13(5) should be removed from the law. As the 
comments above indicate, however, even those PRs who were most lukewarm about 
section 13(5) did not suggest its repeal. No one made this case to us, and only one 
PR we interviewed expressed opinions that might be considered at all relective of 
this argument for thoroughgoing legal change (indeed, this was the only person in 
the whole set of interviews who argued such):
‘I skip over the welfare form. I see that they’ve ticked everything. We tick 
our bit and sign it to say that we’ve gone through the motions but I’m not 
thinking in a consultation about what ... will they be like and then equally, 
who am I to judge? If I think: “Oh my god, that’s going to be a terrible 
parent or people have got totally unrealistic expectations” … you can’t 
then discriminate and say: “Well we’re not doing it then” ... the few cases 
where we’ve not treated, we picked those up at consultation – not through 
a welfare form.’ 
This interviewee was unusual in making the distinction between perceptions they 
might have of another person (that someone might turn out to be a ‘terrible parent’ 
or had ‘totally unrealistic expectations’) and access to treatment, accepting that their 
perceptions of who would make a ‘better parent’ should not inluence the process of 
providing treatment. The more common view, typical of those PRs who answered 
‘yes’ to our question and widespread across interviewees in general, was that it was 
appropriate to take advantage of this opportunity to protect future children. For 
example: 
‘The very fact that we go through the process of assessing this in some way 
gives us a measure of protection in the way that we’re perceived … that it’s 
not ... a designer baby factory. It’s not as though you can turn up and have 
whatever you like. It is a process, we are supposedly about helping families 
to come about, rather than giving people what they want, giving people 
their accessory and giving them exactly the sort of baby they want…. It’s 
been there all the way through … it makes us consider the consequences 
of our actions.’
The ‘consequence’ of assisting others to conceive is, then, quite clearly not only 
about solving a medical problem. It is also about “helping families come about” and 
this means reining in (and being seen to rein in) “giving people what they want”. 
In some cases, what happens biologically and the perceived ‘social’ questions 
were overtly fused in what respondents had to say. The following interviewee (an 
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‘I think ... we have a great responsibility as embryologists. We’re the people 
who are inseminating. We’re creating embryos and therefore if there are 
any concerns, we tend to have ... very, very strong views, you know; well-
informed, educated views on whether ... we think that should proceed.’
Across diferent professions, one theme to emerge was that it is necessary, in order 
to act properly and in accordance with professional responsibilities, to think of ‘the 
child’, not just the person wanting to become pregnant. The following nurse, for 
example, talked of a ‘responsibility to the child’:
‘It’s di cult in a way because a lot of people talk about “playing God” ... 
people who can go and get pregnant on their own don’t have to go through 
all this. We do sometimes have people say: “Why are you looking into this 
so much?” ... But we just say to them: “Well because we have to. Because if 
we are seen to help somebody get pregnant who can’t cope with it … we 
have a responsibility towards the child.”’
Another embryologist explained that, however di cult, staf must consider the needs 
of both the patient and the future child, ‘separate the two’ and be prepared to set aside 
the emotions of the patients if it’s ‘not right for the child’ (who can only be imagined):
‘We get so involved with the couples that sometimes it’s hard to see beyond 
the couple you’ve got in front of you ... and I think that’s di cult, because 
actually you do have to be able to separate the two and if it’s not right for 
… the child, then you have to ignore the emotions that are coming at you 
from the couple, which is really hard. It’s really hard because at the end of 
the day the couple are in front of you and you can see them and talk to 
them and the child isn’t.’
The connection between ‘welfare of the child’ assessments and ‘taking responsibility’ 
also characterised the following PR’s account. The case was made here that the 
responsibility is to ‘the couples’ but also to ‘the children’, and further to ‘society’, 
where treatment is NHS funded: 
‘I think we have a responsibility to the couples that are seeking treatment, to 
any children born as a result of treatment and we also have a responsibility 
to society as a whole, particularly when we’re accessing public funding for 
patients, so I think we have a responsibility there. How far that goes as to 
us assessing who should be a parent or not … if we have concerns then I 
think it’s our responsibility to raise those.’ 
Where the ‘child welfare clause’ was assessed positively, the dominant theme, then, 
was ‘responsibility’. Interviewees communicated that being someone who assists 
conception in others brings with it a role that is not only about addressing biological 
problems using medicine to do so. The role of the professional is also to stand for and 
protect the interests of ‘children’, and the wider ‘society’, which may conlict with 
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Conclusions 
This article began with a summary of ideas in literature critiquing ‘parenting’ as a focus 
for family policy. This literature places emphasis on the moralisation of ‘the child’ and 
a subsequent shift to scrutinising parent–child relations in a way that diminishes the 
previously assumed privacy of the family. Given that policy on assisted conception 
now makes use of this same term ‘parenting’ in an ostensibly more ambiguous way, the 
research discussed above sought to investigate what assessment of ‘supportive parenting’ 
as part of the provision of treatment means in practice, in assisted conception clinics. 
It was clear from the study that the change to the wording of the law, almost 
unanimously viewed positively by staf, has been important in encouraging change 
in practice. Legal change has encouraged staf to ‘not discriminate’ against prospective 
parents on child welfare grounds. In this sense there is strong evidence of a more 
uniformly permissive approach to treatment, in particular of same-sex couples, than 
identiied in some previous research. However, the study also identiied that this 
does not mean that practice simply departs from the suppositions about children 
and parents identiied in commentaries about family policy more generally. Indeed, 
it can be argued that, to the contrary, it is resonant with them. 
Under the prior regulatory regime, the idea that child welfare might include the 
child’s ‘need for … a father’ forged an explicit link to speciic aspects of the potential 
parent’s life, namely is she married to, or in a stable relationship with, a person of the 
opposite sex? It has been argued that forming regulations around these aspects of a 
person’s life already constituted a breach of the line between public and private life, 
by making relationship status and sexuality the basis on which decisions about the 
provision of medical treatment are made (Tizzard, 1998). What this study suggests, 
owever, in line with Gillies’ (2011) observations about the repositioning of family life 
as a public rather than a private concern, is that the giving way of this construction 
of the meaning of child welfare to that which emphasises ‘supportive parenting’ has, 
if anything, led to further dissolving of the boundary between public and private. 
This is not to suggest a high incidence of people being denied treatment, although 
securing funding for that treatment is another matter. Rather, there is dissolution 
of privacy through the investment of clinic staf in scrutinising prospective parents’ 
attitudes and future plans, done in the name of encouraging ‘supportive parenting’. 
A central point made by Gillies (2011) is that the opening up of private life has 
come about as part of a shift to preoccupation with family function, rather than 
form. The research discussed here has detected that this is mirrored, to some extent 
at least, in what happens in pre-conception child welfare assessments. Staf are no 
longer directed by law to focus on the relationship between prospective parents, and 
the future form of family it will give rise to, when taking into account the future 
welfare of a child that may be born (that is, whether the parents are heterosexual 
and whether they are married; indeed, to focus on this is now deemed to constitute 
discrimination). However, it seems that one efect of this move against ‘discrimination’ 
has been to encourage a more direct focus on ‘child welfare’, taken into account in 
the clinic through consideration of the style of life, attitudes and feelings of those 
seeking treatment. In this way, a strong endorsement of ‘non-discrimination’ was 
found to co-exist, with a ‘bleeding out’ of perceptions of what should be discussed 
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be discussed seemed to go in some instances well beyond that considered necessary 
by the regulations, in particular as set out in the HFEA’s COP. 
Our research thus detected, irst, no real rejection of the idea that it should be part 
of the work of staf to ‘gatekeep’ and concern themselves with the welfare of future 
children. Indeed, many respondents were unexpectedly forthright in their comments 
about the importance of their responsibility to ‘the child’ and to ‘society’, not only 
(and occasionally in opposition to) the prospective parent’s interest in being treated. 
There is a reality to assisted conception that shapes what staf have to say (there is 
no conception when welfare assessments are made, ‘the child’, as far as clinic staf 
will have any relation to it, will be never more than an established pregnancy, and 
the only actual person that clinic staf will encounter is the person often desperate 
to be helped to conceive). This means that it is to be expected that discussion of 
the ‘welfare’ of the child can be ambiguous, and some respondents struggled to ind 
the words to explain exactly why they thought it matters. Nevertheless, it appeared 
‘common sense’ to almost all staf interviewed in the study to talk about an imagined, 
future child and raise issues about what that child might need. In this regard, the 
workings of ‘welfare of the child’ assessments resonate strongly with themes identiied 
in critiques of ‘parenting’. ‘The child’ and their ‘welfare’ (as a generality, rather than 
as a speciic child) are the moralised anchor for perceptions of what it is ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ for a clinic to permit. 
Given that there is no child, making this moral precept concrete is understandably 
di cult in the context of assisted conception. The way this was resolved among the 
staf interviewed for this study was, second, also resonant with preoccupations with 
‘parenting’ more generally, in the ways ‘expert’ and ‘professional’ opinion and evidence 
were referred to. Respondents thus seemed most conident about discussing how to 
identify the potential for ‘supportive parenting’ when they could refer to ‘the evidence’; 
for example that which apparently gives knowledge and certainty that lesbian couples 
will be the most supportive parents (and the associated hierarchy through heterosexual 
couples to single women). Some interviewees’ discussion of ‘playing God’ was also 
striking in this regard. ‘Playing God’ was a phrase used in the 1980s by critics of IVF, 
to demonise scientists and doctors and arrest the development of assisted conception 
services, on the grounds that scientiic power to manipulate human biology would 
lead to the moral collapse of society. Today, some clinic staf talk of themselves as ‘playing 
God’, not in order to indicate that they can manipulate biology through technological 
means, but rather to capture their social role as a professional taking responsibility for 
the welfare of future children. Hennum (2014) notes that the role of professionals of 
various kinds in protecting the ‘interests of the child’ has been emphasised and elevated 
as a crucial as part of policy making, and this study suggests that this construction of 
the role of the professional exerts a strong inluence over those who work in assisted 
conception too, becoming apparently at least as important to them as their medical 
role in making a conception occur in those adults often desperate to conceive. 
Overall, it can be concluded from this study that taking into account child welfare 
in assisted conception has developed in a way that resonates strongly with the wider 
realities of the oversight of parent–child relations discussed in other contexts. This is 
not to diminish the importance of the more permissive approach to service provision 
taken, and the efects this has for same-sex couples particularly. It is, however, to indicate 
that this permissiveness can pertain in a way consistent with the continued and even 
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In sociological terms, this points to the continuing relevance of research that looks 
anew at the workings of the medicalisation of family life. 
Notes
1 The HFE Act 1990 established a statutory body – the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) – which publishes a Code of Practice (CoP), which 
includes direction on how clinics should interpret the law.
2 This study was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC number 
ES/I017607/1).
3 Advisory group members were Eric Blyth (Professor of Social Work, University of 
Huddersield), Gillian Douglas (Professor of Law, Cardif University), Geraldine Hartshorne 
(Professorial Fellow, Warwick Medical School), Kirsty Horsey (Lecturer, Kent Law School), 
Jennie Hunt (Senior Infertility Counsellor, Hammersmith Hospital), Clare Lewis-Jones 
(Infertility Network UK), Sarah Norcross (Progress Educational Trust), John Parsons 
(former lead consultant at the Assisted Conception Unit, King’s College Hospital, London) 
and Alan Thornhill (Scientiic Director, The London Bridge Fertility, Gynaecology and 
Genetics Centre). 
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